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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Money laundering is a global problem that has adverse effects on both the 
developed and developing countries. If unchecked, it accelerates crime and criminal 
activities, affects the economy, undermines the integrity of financial markets, 
undermines the legitimate private sector, causes loss of revenue, poses security 
threats to privatisation efforts and brings about reputational risks as well as social 
costs.1  
Given the transnational and cross-border nature of money laundering, the fight 
against it is global. This is why in 1989 the G72 countries decided to set up the 
FATF3 as a global standard-setting body for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and 
combating of terrorist financing (CFT).4 The FATF has since developed standards for 
countries across the globe to adopt so as to facilitate this global fight.5 The standards 
are in the form of recommendations, and so far there are Forty Recommendations 
on money laundering (hereafter referred so as the Recommendations), Eight Special 
                                                             
1
 Moodley (2008: 16). 
2
 Unger B et al (2006: 2). The G7 is a group of seven leading industrialized countries: the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Japan. Russia has recently joined 
and the group is now called the G8.  
 
3
 Allan (2006: III-7). 
4
 FATF Public Statement, 25
 
June 2010, Para 1.  
5
 Johnson (2008: 47). 
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Recommendations on CFT, and a Ninth Special Recommendation on cash-
couriers.6  
In order to enhance its work and the adoption of its Recommendations, the FATF 
has also facilitated the establishment of FATF- styled regional bodies (hereinafter 
referred to as FSRBs) across the world. One such group is ESAAMLG, which was 
established in 1999.7 Its mandate is to coordinate and guide its member countries in 
the implementation of the Recommendations and guidelines. Currently, it has 15 
member countries.8  
Over the first ten years of its existence, among other things, ESAAMLG has through 
its members, achieved the following in its mandate: all members except Uganda 
have enacted AML legislation9 and some have set up structures that are essential for 
the implementation of the Recommendations.  
Despite the above-mentioned achievements, the overall implementation of the 
Recommendations has been generally slow and low. Most of the member countries 
have not yet enforced their enacted AML legislation as evidenced by low rate of 
money laundering prosecutions in the region.10 Some have not yet established 
financial intelligence Units (FIUs) nor ratified or domesticated important AML related 
international legal instruments, let alone train personnel adequately.11 The 
                                                             
6
 FATF‘s Mission Statement. 
7
 ESAAMLG 10 Year Report (2009: 4). 
8
 The members are Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of 
South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Union of Comoros, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
9
 Each member has AML legislation except Uganda, See ESAAMLG 10 Year Report (2009: 88).  
10
 Goredema and Madzima (2009: 8) 
11
 ESAAMLG 10 Year Report (2009:17).  
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international instruments comprise the 2000 United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention)12 and the1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(Vienna Convention)13. There are also inordinate delays in the passing of AML 
legislation as well as the amendment of other domestic legislation, which is 
necessary in order to harmonise such laws with the AML standards. This gives rise 
to unevenness, disconnectedness and time variability in the implementation of the 
Recommendations among the member countries. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The main question this paper seeks to answer is this: Are there obstacles to the 
implementation of the Recommendations in Eastern and Southern Africa? 
As noted above, there is low level of implementation of the Recommendations within 
the ESAAMLG region.14 On the surface, it appears that the member countries take 
the ―adopt but not enforce or implement‖ strategy.15 This means that countries adopt 
certain policies as a way of succumbing to international pressure but without proper 
analysis and acceptance of the costs or embracing the benefits that come with such 
adoption.16 Thus the adoption is merely a face-saving exercise aimed at avoiding 
embarrassment on the international arena or to access benefits such as economic 
                                                             
12
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 in Palermo. 
Entered into force on 29 September 2003. 
13
 Adopted on 20 December 1988 in Vienna. Entered into force on 11 November 1990. 
14
 ESAAMLG 10 Year Report (2009:17). 
15
 Tang and Lishan (2010: 218). 
16
 Sharman (2008: 651). 
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aid from developed countries.17 This could be one explanation for the insufficient 
implementation of the Recommendations by ESAAMLG member countries.  
This paper therefore seeks to explore the key obstacles impeding the 
implementation of the Recommendations among ESAAMLG members. In so doing, 
the paper shall explore the reasons why the members joined ESAAMLG and 
committed themselves to adopting the Recommendations in the first place. This 
exploration will in a way help to reveal the root to the obstacles that are currently 
affecting the level of implementation. 
The pertinent questions this paper seeks to answer are as follows: 
--What prompted the joining of ESAAMLG and the pledges of commitment at the 
adoption of the Recommendations in the first place?  
-What are the common key obstacles impeding the implementation of the 
Recommendations among ESAAMLG members? 
-Are the member countries ready to bear the cost of implementing the 
Recommendations at the expense of their other respective national priorities?  
-Does the FATF have effective mechanisms for enforcing the implementation of its 
Recommendations so as to ensure that ESAAMLG member countries do not get 
away with the ―adopt but do not enforce or implement strategy‖? 
In addressing these questions, this paper will discuss the tension that exists on the 
one hand, between the benefits of implementing the Recommendations, on the other 
                                                             
17
 Tang and Lishan (2010: 218). 
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hand, the costs that come with it and which must be disbursed at the expense of 
other pressing issues affecting the developing ESAAMLG member countries. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
Given the dangers that money laundering can cause to states and to the world 
economy, it is imperative that the fight against this vice should be global and 
harmonised. ESAAMLG, through its members, would contribute significantly towards 
this fight if all member countries prioritise and are able to implement the 
Recommendations. This research paper will accordingly help to contribute to the 
understanding of the key obstacles that impede implementation and thereby assist 
the member countries, ESAAMLG, the FATF and all other players on how best these 
obstacles may be addressed in the developing regions.  
The findings of this study will contribute towards how similar FATF-styled regional 
bodies in the developing world may best tackle the implementation of the 
Recommendations since the obstacles are bound to be significantly similar for all 
developing countries. Unless these obstacles are addressed, the global combating of 
money laundering will never be effective since developing regions such as 
ESAAMLG will remain the weakest link and safe havens for launderers.  
1.4 Scope of the Research Paper 
This research is limited to ESAAMLG and its member countries. The obstacles under 
discussion are common to all member countries, so reference will be made to all or 
most of the member countries when giving examples. It should be noted that the 
mandate of both the FATF and ESAAMLG covers both money laundering and 
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terrorist financing. However, for purposes of this research, the focus will be on 
money laundering alone. 
1.5 Hypothesis 
This study is based on the assumption that developing countries hastily adopt AML 
policies as a way of succumbing to international pressure before they are fully 
prepared to implement such policies. They adopt them before taking into account 
costs of implementation, their underdeveloped financial markets and political 
situations. This proves to be a problem especially when the implementation of such 
policies competes with other domestic priorities or meets reluctance from key 
stakeholders and political decision makers. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This study will adopt the desktop research methodology. It will involve the reading 
and analysis of primary sources such as international Conventions, treaties, 
memoranda of understanding, official reports and national laws. The secondary 
resources will range from books, journal articles, conference papers and electronic 
resources. 
1.7 Chapter Outlines 
This paper comprises five chapters. The remaining chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2:  
This chapter discusses the definition of money laundering as well as the AML legal 
framework at international, regional and national levels.  
Chapter 3:  
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This chapter will deal with the scale, effects and relevance of money laundering 
within and to ESAAMLG member countries. It will first give the scale of money 
laundering at the global level. 
Chapter 4:  
This chapter will explore the obstacles faced by the ESAAMLG member countries in 
the implementation of the Recommendations. It will also discuss the possible roots of 
such obstacles.  
Chapter 5: 
This final chapter comprises the current FATF‘s solutions to the obstacles, a general 
conclusion of the paper and then recommendations by the author. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEFINITION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
2.1 Introduction 
Money Laundering has diverse definitions and is regulated globally. This chapter will 
discuss its definition as well as its legal framework, both at global level and at the 
Eastern and Southern African regional level. 
2.2 Definition 
Money laundering has been defined differently in different writings. It is the process 
of manipulating legally or illegally acquired wealth in a way that obscures its 
existence, origin or ownership for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement.18 It is 
also described as a deliberate, complicated and sophisticated process by which 
proceeds of crime are disguised or made to appear as if they were earned by 
legitimate means. Simser defines it as a technique designed to make illicit acquisitive 
gains appear legitimate, usually by disguising the property‘s illegal provenance.19  
What comes out clearly from these definitions is that the proceeds of a crime or 
illegal activity are made to appear as if they are from a legal and ‗clean‘ source or 
activity. Furthermore, the definitions do not limit the concept to laundering of money 
by using terms like wealth, proceeds of crime and illicit acquisitive gains. So even 
though the concept is termed money laundering, it is not limited to money alone. On 
this point it has been argued that using the term ‗money‘ on ‗money laundering‘  as a 
                                                             
18
 Mugarura (2011: 60). 
  
19
 Simser (2006: 294). 
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descriptive tag for the object of laundering is quite misleading, as money is only one 
of a variety of susceptible assets.20 Perhaps the question that comes to mind at this 
stage is how does one launder money or proceeds of crime? Well, there are three 
different stages of money laundering and these will be discussed below. 
2.3 Stages of Laundering 
Proceeds of crime are laundered in three different phases. These are placement, 
layering and integration.  
Placement involves the physical movement of currency or other funds derived from 
illegal activities to a place or into a form that is less suspicious to law enforcement 
authorities and more convenient to the criminal.21 The second stage is layering, 
which involves the separation of proceeds from their illegal source by using multiple, 
complex financial transactions e.g. wire transfers and monetary instruments.22  
Finally, there is integration, which involves the conversion of illegal proceeds into 
apparently legitimate business earnings through normal financial or commercial 
operations.23 All these stages are pursued by criminals in order to distance the 
proceeds and themselves from the criminal activity, thereby concealing their illicit 
source and nature. 
2.4 Legal Framework 
Money laundering is regulated at the global, regional as well as national levels. 
                                                             
20
 Goredema (2003: 1). 
 
21
 Reuter and Truman (2004:  25). 
22
 Okgbule (2007: 450). 
23
 Reuter and Truman (2004: 25). 
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2.4.1 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The FATF24 is a global standard-setting body for AML.25 It is an international 
organisation formed in July 1981 by the G7countries. 26 It is also described as an 
international task force with a specific purpose to establish international standards,  
to develop and promote policies for the combating of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.27 Its work is coordinated by a secretariat which is based at the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) offices in Paris, 
France.28 
2.4.2 The FATF’s Membership 
The FATF has 36 members, comprising 34 jurisdictions29 and two regional 
organisations30 representing most major financial centres in all parts of the globe31. 
Its membership is open to countries that are fully committed at the political level to 
the implementation of the Recommendations, and are strategically important, among 
other factors.32  
                                                             
24
 Allan (2006: III-7). 
25
 FATF Public Statement (25
 
June 2010: para1). 
26
 Madinger (2006: 100).  
27
 World Bank (2009: 24). 
28
 Stephens et al (2005: 248). 
29
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
 
 
 
30
 World Bank, (2009: 24). The organisations are the European Commission and the Gulf Co-
operation Council on Hong Kong.  
 
31
 See FATF members and observers.  
32
 World Bank (2009: 52). The other two remaining factors are that a country should (a) be a member 
of the nearest and applicable FSRB, or (b) work closely with the FATF or undertake to lead in the 
establishment of an FSRB where none exists; should have criminalised the laundering of proceeds of 
11 
 
The FATF also has associate members, comprising the existing FATF-Styled 
Regional Bodies (FSRBSs) across the globe. FSRBs are task forces with regional 
jurisdiction that are modelled on the FATF in their mandate, functions and methods 
of operation.33 An example is the ESAAMLG, which is the main focus of this paper. 
The rest are the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), Council of Europe MONEYVAL Committee 
and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America 
(GASIFUD), Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA) and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENAFATF).34 
Furthermore, the FATF has observer members. These are international 
organisations and bodies with wider mandates that have adopted initiatives in 
fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. They include the United Nations 
(UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Egmont Group35 
and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.36 These organisations also 
provide technical assistance on AML capacity building, among others, hence will be 
referred to as technical assistance providers in this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
crime and other serious offences and finally should have already made it mandatory for financial 
institutions to identify their customers and to report unusual or suspicious transactions. 
 
33
 World Bank (2009: 28). 
34
 See FATF members and observers.  
35
 World Bank (2009: 28). The EGMONT group is an international network of FIUs. 
36
 World Bank (2009: 28). 
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2.4.3 The FATF’s Mandate and Purpose 
As pointed out earlier, the FATF‘s purpose is to develop and promote national and 
international strategies for AML and CFT.37 As a policy making body, it also attempts 
to generate the necessary political will to bring about national AML and CFT 
legislative and regulatory reforms.38 Furthermore, the FAFT‘s other core functions 
include ensuring the implementation of its Recommendations by countries, studying 
the techniques and typologies39 on money laundering and terrorist financing, and 
conducting outreach activities that aim to spread its standards globally.40 
2.4.4 The Evolution and Nature of the FATF Recommendations 
The FATF is characterised by the Recommendations it issues, which form the basis 
of most of the national AML laws.41 In 1990, the FATF first issued the so-called Forty 
Recommendations on money laundering, which set out a basic, universally 
applicable framework of measures covering the criminal justice system, the financial 
sector, certain designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), and 
mechanisms of international cooperation.42 The first set of Recommendations issued 
in 1990 only focused on the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking but their ambit 
was expanded in 1996 to cover laundering of proceeds of any serious crime.43 The 
                                                             
37
 Hopton (2009: 8).    
38
 Hopton (2009: 8). 
39
 Typologies refer to the study and classification of trends and methods used for laundering money 
and the financing of terrorism. See FATF Methods and Trends.  
40
 World Bank (2009: 24). 
41
Hopton (2009: 17). 
42
 IMF Fact sheet ‗The IMF and the fight against Money Laundering and the financing of terrorism‘ 
(2011: 2).  
43
 FATF Annual Report (2010:  5).  
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FATF also issued Eight Special Recommendations on financing of terrorism 
following the September 11 Twin tower bombings in the USA in 2001, and then in 
2004, a Ninth Special Recommendation on cash couriers, which applies to both 
money laundering and financing of terrorism.44  
These Recommendations give effect to the FATF‘s standard-setting mandate and 
are essentially soft law.45 This means that they are best practice guidelines for 
countries to base their AML initiatives on, but countries are not bound by them.  
2.4.5 Who Developed the FATF Recommendations? 
Answering this question will help in the understanding of the involvement of 
developing countries such as ESAAMLG members, in the development of the 
Recommendations. As stated earlier, the FATF was founded by the G7 countries 
and they exclusively drafted the first Forty Recommendations in 1990. However, they 
invited eight countries to join the FATF46 so as to expand its expertise and to get 
their views on the AML cause, which the G7 had embarked on.47  
In addition, all OECD and financial centre countries were invited to the FATF‘s 
second meeting in July 199048 so as to give them a chance to indicate what would 
                                                             
44
 FATF Annual Report (2010: 5).  
45
 Blazejewski (2008: 10). 
46
 Gilmore (1992: 1138). The eight countries were Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia.  
47
 FATF Annual Report (1991: 4). 
48
 FATF Annual Report (1991: 4). Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, 
Hong-Kong, Singapore and the Gulf Co-operation Council (comprising Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. 
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be at stake for them if they endorsed the Recommendations.49 However, all the other 
countries were merely invited to participate in the AML cause and to implement the 
FATF Recommendations as they found them.50  
The question at this point would be how did the Recommendations trickle down to 
Africa then to ESAAMLG? Well, this was achieved through the FATF‘s regional 
mobilisation program it carried through regional meetings in Asia Pacific, Central and 
Eastern Europe, Caribbean Islands and Central American States, Africa and Latin 
America.51 The purpose of the meetings was merely to assess the position of the 
countries in these regions on AML and to obtain their endorsement of the 
Recommendations.52 It is clear therefore that these countries, including ESAAMLG 
members, did not contribute to the drafting of the Recommendations but were only 
asked to endorse them. 
The adoption and endorsement of the Recommendations trickled to Eastern and 
Southern Africa in October 1996 following a conference organised by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the FATF, attended by 13 of the current ESAAMLG 
member countries.53 This meeting was part of the FATF‘s outreach program, an 
extension of the regional mobilisation program with the aim of spreading the AML 
message and encouraging non-members to adopt the Recommendations. At the end 
                                                             
49
 G7 Houston Economic Declaration of July 11, 1990.  
50
 G7 Houston Economic Declaration of July 11, 1990.  
51
 FATF Annual Report (1991: 13).  
52
 FATF Annual Report (1991: 13). 
53
 FATF Annual Report (1997: 25). Countries in attendance were Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
15 
 
of the Conference, the participants agreed among other things, on the urgent need to 
enact AML laws, set up national AML committees and also a proposal to set up a 
regional mechanism which would establish a Southern and Eastern African Financial 
Action Task Force (now ESAAMLG).54 These agreements were made upon realising 
that all of the participating countries had not yet criminalised money laundering, yet 
there were a number of criminal activities whose illicit proceeds were being 
laundered in different ways in the region.55 
Despite saying that the participants of the Cape Town Conference agreed to enact 
AML legislation, it is evident that some were not yet convinced of the relevance of an 
AML regime. Case in point is a Malawian Economics and Planning Minister who 
expressed at an international summit in 2006, that despite arguing that Malawi did 
not have a money laundering risk, he was told that whatever the case, Malawi had to 
adopt the AML policy.56 He was then told failure to adopt the AML policy would make 
it hard for Malawi to transact with the outside world and thus discourage foreign 
investment.57 ‗Then the minister concluded ―we were told as told‖: the country 
adopted the standard AML package.‘58 
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2.4.6 The Enforcement of the FATF Recommendations 
The FATF monitors the implementation of its Recommendations through mutual 
evaluations and annual self assessments. During mutual evaluations, a team of 
assessors from other countries periodically assesses the AML system of a particular 
jurisdiction and rate the level of its compliance with the Recommendations.59 In a self 
assessment, a country makes an assessment of its own AML system.60  
Enforcement of compliance through mutual evaluations puts countries under peer 
pressure61 in the sense that the assessors produce mutual evaluation reports (MERs) 
which are made public through the FATF or FSRB websites. Such publication works 
negatively for developing countries (such as ESAAMLG countries) when they  are 
rated non-compliant and are labelled as crime havens, as this may lead into 
discouraging foreign direct investment or limiting foreign governmental aid.62 
Furthermore, the FATF has another enforcement mechanism whereby it identifies 
jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that pose a threat to the 
international financial system.63 The FATF helps such jurisdictions in developing 
action plans on how best to address their deficiencies and all this is done through its 
International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG).64 The identified jurisdictions are 
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thus labelled as high risk and non-complying jurisdictions, through Public Statements 
Published on the FATF website.65 As a result of the publicity, the identified 
jurisdictions make political commitments to implement the Recommendations.66 
In cases where the identified jurisdictions fail to address their deficiencies 
meaningfully, the FATF calls upon all countries to take counter-measures when 
dealing with such jurisdictions, so as to protect the international financial system 
from the risks arising from the deficiencies.67 The counter-measures include all 
countries advising their financial institutions to give special attention to business 
relationships and transactions with an identified country, including its companies and 
financial institutions.68 
For jurisdictions that do not make considerable progress in addressing their 
deficiencies, the FATF also calls upon all countries to take precautionary measures 
when dealing with them, in view of the risks they pose to the international financial 
system.69 Within ESAAMLG, this measure has been taken against Kenya.70 Namibia, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe too have been recently identified as countries with strategic 
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deficiencies, hence they have made commitments to work on the deficiencies, 
according to the actions plans they have drawn with the FATF.71 
2.5 The FATF Recommendations and International Legal Instruments. 
The FATF standards build upon a number of UN Conventions. These include the 
Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention. An illustration on this point is the 
first part of the FATF‘s Recommendation 1, which encourages countries to 
criminalise money laundering on the basis of these two Conventions.72 These 
Conventions collectively promote international cooperation in preventing and 
containing drug trafficking, domestic and cross border organised crime, corruption 
and the financing of terrorism.73  
The Vienna Convention, in particular, has provided what has become a globally 
accepted definition of the offence of money laundering.74 In a nutshell, the 
Convention criminalises the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from any offence or offences established under the convention, or 
from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing 
or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions75.  
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Furthermore, it also criminalises the concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of 
property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences 
established under the Convention or from an act of participation in such an offence 
or offences.76 What has been criminalised by this Convention forms the gist of the 
different definitions of money laundering given earlier in this chapter. Finally, the 
Convention also contains detailed provisions on international cooperation under its 
Article 2.77 Following this Article, international cooperation is consequently provided 
for under the FATF‘s Recommendations 36 to 40.78 
As for the Palermo Convention, it is the first binding international instrument that 
deals with organised crime in a comprehensive manner.79 Its Article 1 states that its 
purpose is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised 
crime more effectively. It has also contributed significantly to the codification of AML 
standards of prevention and control.80 Example in point is Article 7 which, among 
others, encourages countries to institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank institutions in order to deter and detect 
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all forms of money laundering.81 These measures are reflected under the FATF‘s 
Recommendations 4 to 25 on preventive measures.82 
Another Convention worth mentioning is the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999),83 which relates to the 
Recommendations pertaining to CFT, the Special Eight Recommendations. However, 
this aspect will not be dealt with in detail, as this paper focuses only on AML 
Recommendations. 
2.6 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group  
As pointed out, ESAAMLG is an East and Southern African regional body styled on 
the FATF. Following the agreement to set up such a body at the Cape Town 
Conference discussed earlier, ESAAMLG was launched on 27 August 1999 at a 
meeting of Eastern and Southern African Ministers of Finance in Arusha, Tanzania.84 
The meeting was attended by nine member countries85 but the membership has now 
increased to 15 member countries.86 The meeting was a culmination of consultations 
that had taken place since 1995 on the need to develop a regional mechanism to co-
operate in the implementation of AML programmes.87  
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It was agreed at the meeting that, given the threat of cross-border crime and money 
laundering in the region, there was a need to cooperate with other States in 
combating money laundering by implementing AML international instruments.88 The 
meeting therefore adopted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)89 as an 
instrument that would enable the members to forge the process of cooperation for 
implementing the Recommendations.90 By signing the ESAAMLG MOU at this 
meeting, member countries endorsed the Recommendations and affirmed their 
commitment to implement them in order to combat money laundering at a national 
level.91 The MOU therefore stands as a symbol of commitment by ESAAMLG 
members, and serves as a frame of reference for the operations of ESAAMG. 
2.6.1 National Initiatives Undertaken by ESAAMLG Member States. 
Apart from the international and regional AML initiatives discussed earlier, 
ESAAMLG member countries are encouraged to domestically implement the 
objectives stated in the ESAAMLG MOU. These objectives include an undertaking to 
adopt and implement the Recommendations; apply AML measures to all serious 
crimes; and to implement any other measures contained in multilateral agreements 
and initiatives to which they subscribe, for the prevention and control of the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime.92 
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The work of the member countries at national level is coordinated by national multi-
disciplinary committees drawn from three sectors, namely Finance, Justice and Law 
enforcement.93 At present, each member country has its own national committee.  
Most of the member countries have also enacted AML laws.94 Six member countries  
have functioning FIUs,95 which are central points for national AML programs because 
they are agencies that provide for the exchange of information between financial 
institutions and law enforcement at both national and international level.96 They act 
as a link between the private and public sector in the fight against money Laundering, 
by analysing suspicious transaction reports (STRs) they get from financial institutions, 
and eventually disseminating their analysis to law enforcement authorities for further 
action, in cases where money laundering activities are suspected.97 
The nature of both National Committees and FIUs show the importance of 
coordination and cooperation among different players from different sectors in the 
AML discourse, even at national level. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Given the cross-border and complex nature of money laundering, there are initiatives 
both at the international, regional as well as national levels to prevent and fight it. 
The FATF (created by the G7 countries) is an umbrella body responsible for setting 
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AML standards, while ESAAMLG, among other FSRBs, is a regional body, diffusing 
the FATF initiatives in the Eastern and Southern African region. The FATF‘s 
standards are in form of Recommendations, which were exclusively drafted and 
developed by developed countries. Developing countries such as ESAAMLG 
members were only invited to endorse and implement them later on through the 
FATF‘s regional mobilisation and outreach programs. Some countries like Malawi 
adopted the AML standards even before being convinced of their relevance to their 
local contexts. 
The FATF works in collaboration with various international bodies such as the World 
Bank, IMF and the UN. Some of the Recommendations were inspired by and rest on 
international legal instruments such as the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. The 
FATF monitors enforcement of its Recommendations through mutual evaluations, 
self assessment exercises and the ICRG process. These monitoring mechanisms 
put pressure on countries to adopt and implement the Recommendations.  
Finally, ESAAMLG countries have themselves launched their own respective 
initiatives aimed at implementing the FATF standards under the guidance of the 
ESSAMLG Secretariat. Examples are the establishing of National Committees, the 
enactment of AML legislation as well as the setting up of FIUs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SCALE AND EFFECTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how money laundering manifests itself at both the global and 
ESAAMLG level. It focuses on how money laundering affects on the development of 
the ESAAMLG member countries and shows the relevance of the FATF 
Recommendations in this respect. 
3.2 The Global Scale of Money Laundering  
In 1996, the IMF estimated that the money laundered annually is between 2 and 5 
percent of the world‘s gross domestic product.98 This translates into an amount 
between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion. The FATF estimates that the $590 billion is 
roughly equivalent to the value of the total output of an economy the size of Spain‘s. 
But it is impossible to produce a reliable estimate of the amount of money laundered, 
and therefore the FATF does not publish any figures in this regard.99 
Walker, the first analyst who attempted to quantify how much money is laundered, 
suggested in his 1999 study that $2,85 trillion is laundered globally per year.100 This 
was almost twice the estimated $1.7 trillion federal budget of the USA in 1999.101   
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These estimates show how much money criminals would cream away as proceeds 
of crime if there are no measures to take away such profit from them.   
3.3 Money Laundering in Eastern and Southern Africa 
This study makes no pretences at precisely quantifying how much money is 
laundered in the Eastern and South African region, for no data exists on the nature, 
varieties and extent of money laundering in the region.102 However, Walker 
estimated that the total amount laundered internally and brought into the ESAAMLG 
region during 1999 was equal to just over US$18,07 billion.103 Nevertheless, in order 
to get a broader picture of the problem in the region, it is imperative to look at the 
predicate offences for money laundering that are prevalent in the region. This will 
indicate which crimes constitute the basis of money laundering in the region, as most 
of them are profitable to the criminals, and it is this profit that AML initiatives target. 
Using such indications is acceptable, given that the clandestine nature of money 
laundering makes it difficult to obtain statistics on its scale and frequency.104  
3.3.1 Drug Trafficking 
Drug trafficking is associated with money laundering everywhere in the region.105 It 
generates huge proceeds that go undetected, due mainly to the generally low levels 
of AML/CFT implementation in the region.106 This makes the region a low-risk-high 
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premium destination for generating proceeds of crime and laundering them with 
relative ease.107 The most recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) world drug report has revealed that East Africa is reportedly the main 
intermediary target for drug trafficking activities, while the Southern African region 
registers the largest amounts of African heroin seizures.108   
The first example in Southern Africa is Malawi where the biggest crime challenge is 
the production and trade in Indian hemp, and reports indicate that the production is 
increasing steadily and the trade is worth millions of US dollars.109 In the Seychelles, 
drug trafficking is also considered a major source of illicit money, such that over the 
recent past, several Seychellois nationals have been arrested in Kenya, India, 
Mauritius and Tanzania on charges of drug trafficking.110  
Namibia is a route for hard drugs that come from South America and Asia into 
Southern Africa, and some of the hard drugs destined for Europe from these regions 
come through South Africa for re-routing to the European region and sometimes to 
Canada.111 Some of the drugs are routed to South Africa through Luanda and Dar es 
Salaam.112 Zambia also faces drug trafficking as one of the major predicate offences 
that give rise to money laundering.113 Zimbabwe is associated with trade of illicit 
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drugs in which the country is used as a transit point for cannabis and South Asian 
heroin, mandrax and methamphetamines destined for the South African and 
European markets.114 In Eastern Africa, drug trafficking is a major problem in 
Uganda.115  
3.3.2 Corruption 
Corruption is regarded as a serious offence, which contributes to money laundering 
in all member countries.116 The link between corruption and money laundering has 
been expressed in the preamble of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption.117 Generally, corruption in Africa is known to be rife.118 Within ESAAMLG, 
the Transparency International‘s (TI) 2010 Corruption Perception Index shows that 
on a scale of zero and ten, six out of the 15 ESAAMLG member countries scored 
less than three out of ten, where ten indicates a very clean jurisdiction in terms of 
corruption and zero represents a highly corrupt jurisdiction.119 Only Botswana and 
Mauritius scored above five, i.e. 5.8 and 5.4, respectively. The other countries fall 
between 3.8 and 4.8. These scores indicate the magnitude of corruption in the region.  
By way of illustration, in Tanzania as of 30th September 2008, 4768 corruption cases 
were reported out of which 360 were prosecuted and 30 convictions secured.120 In 
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Zambia, too, corruption is considered one of the serious predicate offences giving 
rise to money laundering.121 The same applies to Zimbabwe, in particular corrupt 
practices in the fuel industry involving both private and public institutions.122 
3.3.3 Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking into and out of the South-Eastern African region is regarded as the 
third most problematic form of syndicate crime in Southern Africa, after drug 
trafficking and motor vehicle theft.123 A survey conducted by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) shows that Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland are all 
affected by human trafficking either as source, transit or as destination countries.124 
All these countries, except South Africa but including Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda 
are also affected by trafficking of under-age children who are used for sex tourism in 
South Africa.125 
3.3.4 Other Major Activities that Yield Illegal Proceeds 
Other criminal activities prevalent in the region are the following: fraud; under 
invoicing of exports; theft and smuggling of motor vehicles within and into the region 
through East Africa and the Eastern seaboard of Southern Africa; currency 
externalisation, which may use fraudulent documentation and shell companies; 
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cross- border smuggling of cash; the abuse of currency exchanges; illicit dealings in 
precious resources; as well as cash in transit robberies.126 Weak AML systems make 
these crimes thrive undetected, leaving criminals to enjoy the proceeds derived from 
them. 
In Malawi for instance, the most cases, apart from drug trafficking, involve armed 
robbery of vehicles and fraud.127 In Uganda, income generating crimes such as duty 
fraud and smuggling have increased sharply in recent years, and the proceeds are 
laundered through the acquisition of land, buildings, houses, cars, shops and other 
forms of businesses.128 In the Seychelles, parallel market operations, theft and fraud 
are considered as the major source of illegal proceeds.129 For South Africa, major 
profit-generating crimes include fraud, theft, corruption, racketeering, precious 
metals smuggling, abalone poaching, the ―419‖ Nigerian-type economic/investment 
frauds and pyramid schemes, with increasing numbers of sophisticated and large-
scale economic crimes and crimes through criminal syndicates.130 
3.4 Effects of Money Laundering 
Money laundering can undermine the integrity and stability of financial institutions 
and systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort international capital flows.131 
It may have negative consequences for a country‘s financial stability and 
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macroeconomic performance, resulting in draining of resources from more 
productive economic activities and even having spill-over destabilizing effects on the 
economies of other countries. This applies to both the developed and developing 
worlds, but the effects are more adverse in developing countries as will be illustrated 
in the discussion below. 
3.4.1 Weakens Financial Systems 
Money laundering weakens the financial systems which are the main players for 
global financial transactions.132 This is so because the integrity of the banking and 
financial services marketplace depends heavily on the perception that it functions 
within a framework of high legal, professional and ethical standards.133 Now if a bank 
is too complacent and lets criminals launder money through it, it is perceived as 
being in cahoots with criminals and their activities. This negatively affects the way it 
is perceived by other financial intermediaries, regulators and even ordinary clients.134  
In this way, money laundering can undermine the health of the financial system 
through the erosion of credibility, which is a fundamental concept in the modern 
financial economy.135 This raises another critical concern as regards economic 
development of jurisdictions with such complacent financial institutions, as will be 
discussed below. 
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3.4.2 Affects Economic Growth 
A broad range of recent economic analyses point to the conclusion that in 
developing countries, strong financial institutions such as banks, non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) and equity markets is critical to economic growth.136   
Particularly in developing countries, investor confidence is diminished by money 
laundering activity, and this plays a special role in the linkage between financial 
institutions and economic growth.137 If these institutions are negatively affected by 
money laundering, it means countries will hardly benefit from the investment 
opportunities which sound banking systems attract. The weakening effects of money 
laundering on financial institutions are thus detrimental to developing countries like 
ESAAMLG members, which are at crucial stages of socio-economic development.  
3.4.3 Facilitates Crime and Corruption 
Money laundering also facilitates crime and corruption within developing economies, 
which is incompatible with sustainable economic growth.138 Corruption and all other 
economic crimes affect economic growth in the sense that money laundering 
reduces the criminals' cost of crime, thereby increasing the level of crime. Most 
importantly, targeting the money laundering aspect of criminal activity and depriving 
criminals of their ill-gotten gains means hitting them where they feel the pain most, 
which is their pockets. Without a usable profit, the criminal activity will not 
continue.139 Furthermore, where AML measures are ineffective, criminals have a 
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field-day. They are therefore especially attracted to jurisdictions with weak or 
ineffective controls where they can move their funds in and out with impunity.140 The 
effects of such crimes cannot be ignored.141  
Corruption has damaging economic effects facilitated by money laundering and 
these effects are particularly acute in the public sector in many developing countries 
because of the larger role the government often plays in providing goods and 
services.142 The societal costs of corruption are that it weakens confidence in public 
institutions, damages the private investment climate, and ruins delivery mechanisms 
for such poverty alleviation programs as public health and education.143  
If corruption goes undetected and unchecked, it can among others, impede the 
adoption and implementation of effective AML measures by interfering with the 
capacity of institutions or officials who are entrusted with such adoption and 
implementation.144 It can therefore be inferred that in an inherently corrupt system, 
laws, systems and procedures adopted to fight money laundering and its underlying 
offences cannot function effectively.145 Given the interconnectedness between 
money laundering and corruption and their combined effects upon developing 
countries, ESAAMLG needs to step up its prophylactic actions to avoid member 
states lapsing into lax jurisdictions with porous systems. 
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3.4.4 Loss of Revenue 
Money laundering also reduces the tax base of a country, thereby causing a decline 
in tax revenues collected by governments.146 As a result governments have to levy 
higher taxes in order to provide necessary services to their citizens.147 This happens 
because money launderers disguise their proceeds in various ways and as such they 
are not openly available or accounted for. Consequently, revenue authorities hardly 
have access to such funds for tax purposes. Lack of revenue is detrimental to 
developing countries as they rely on them to provide the much-needed infrastructure 
and amenities for the public, such as schools, hospitals, roads, houses, and a host of 
other basic facilities that are indispensable for socio-economic development. 
3.4.5 Risk to Privatisation Efforts 
Money launderers threaten the efforts of many countries to reform their economies 
through privatisation.148 They can pose as a risk to privatisation efforts by purchasing 
institutions previously owned by government, not for business purposes but for use 
as fronts for their criminal activities.149 The risk is higher in developing countries 
which are keen to attract direct foreign investment, yet risk dealing with money 
launderers who are likely to have the financial power to out-bid legitimate 
investors.150  
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When illicit proceeds are invested in this manner, criminals increase their potential 
for more criminal activities as well as depriving the country of what should be a 
legitimate, market-based, tax-paying enterprise.151 This proves detrimental especially 
for developing countries since such institutions are no longer run for the common 
good of a country and its citizens or its economy, but for laundering proceeds of 
crime. The whole purpose of privatisation is therefore defeated and its benefits to a 
developing country trampled on. 
3.4.6 Reputational Risk 
Investments are good for developing countries. However, it may be hard for a 
country to attract legitimate investments if there is a perception that the country has 
a poor track record of dealing with money laundering or is seen to be a centre for 
money laundering.152 This is because legitimate investors do not want to be 
associated with any country that has a negative reputation for fear of negatively 
affecting their reputation as well. Sound financial systems are essential for private 
entrepreneurs to emerge, for business to flourish, and for local people and investors 
from abroad to find the confidence to invest, and create wealth, income, and jobs.153  
Investment is hence hard to attract where investors‘ confidence is eroded by the 
negative reputation of a country‘s financial systems occasioned by money 
laundering. The IMF has also cautioned against these risks, pointing to the 
concomitant adverse consequences.154 
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For instance the Seychelles, in order to attract foreign investors, passed a law in 
1995155 that was perceived to be attractive to criminals and money launderers 
because it assured investors immunity from prosecution for any criminal  activities to 
all whose investment was not less than 10,000,000 US dollars.156 Consequently, the 
FATF explicitly condemned the Seychelles and this law and according to its 
Recommendation 21, the FATF urged its members to apply special scrutiny to all 
transactions involving the Seychelles.157 Eventually the law was withdrawn and the 
Seychellois blacklist was withdrawn by the FATF, but despite the withdrawal, the 
reputational effect on the Seychelles lingered.158 
3.4.7 Facilitates Capital flight 
Money laundering can be seen as a key element in illicit capital flight from 
throughout the developing world. Each of the major episodes of rapid, large –scale 
illicit capital flight from developing (and transition) countries has been facilitated with 
identifiable centres of money laundering activity.159 In this regard, money launderers 
move their money in and out of jurisdictions, sometimes rapidly, to obscure the audit 
trail. The rapid movement of large amounts of money in and out of a country can 
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destabilize small developing economies160 such as the economies of most of the 
ESAAMLG members. 
3.4.8 Defeats the Rule of Law 
The Rule of law presumes that there is a transparent system of clear and certain 
rules that is applied consistently to all subjects. Most importantly, establishing a legal 
system based on the Rule of Law is considered a precondition for economic 
development because markets need reliable institutions to be able to function.  
However, money laundering threatens the Rule of Law directly.161 This is so because 
it provides organised crime with its cash flow, investment capital and the incentive to 
commit more proceeds-generating crime, both nationally and internationally.162 
Where criminals have enormous economic power and capacity to commit such 
crimes with impunity because their proceeds go undetected, it has already been 
argued above that crime increases. In this way, money laundering allows criminals to 
defeat law enforcement and to escape the consequences of their acts.163 Pervasive 
money laundering therefore undermines the rule of law in the society.164 
                                                             
160
 World Bank (2009: 19). 
161
 Opening Address by Vasil Kirov, MONEYVAL Chairman, at Joint FATF/MONEYVAL Experts 
Meeting on Typologies.  
162
 Opening Address by Vasil Kirov, MONEYVAL Chairman, at Joint FATF/MONEYVAL Experts 
Meeting on Typologies.  
163
 World Bank (2009: 20). 
164
 World Bank (2009: 20. 
37 
 
3.5 Why Should ESAAMLG Members Fight Money Laundering? 
Having looked at the effects of money laundering on developing countries, the 
relevance of the fight against money laundering within ESAAMLG cannot be ignored 
for the following reasons. 
3.5.1 Fights Crime and Corruption 
Crime and corruption are both counter-productive and destabilising for developing 
countries. A strong AML institutional framework that includes a broad scope of 
predicate offences for money laundering helps to fight crime and corruption in 
general.165 ESAAMLG member countries are faced with a number of predicate 
offences for money laundering, most of which have different negative effects on the 
countries in different ways as already discussed. As stated earlier, corruption is 
regarded as a serious offence, which contributes to money laundering in all member 
countries.166   
Generally, a well-functioning AML system makes it difficult for corrupt officials to 
expatriate their ill-gotten funds and it also allows such funds to be repatriated in 
cases where they have been deposited abroad.167 This is because AML measures 
create channels of information that help to trace the fleeing funds and also enable 
cooperation among law enforcement officers in different countries.168 
                                                             
165
 Allan (2006: II-7). 
166
 Goredema and Madzima (2009: 7).  
167
 World Bank (2009: 22). 
168
 World Bank (2009: 22). 
38 
 
Apart from corruption, ESSAMLG member countries face many other crimes like 
fraud, armed robbery, drug trafficking and human trafficking. In this regard, an 
effective AML regime is a deterrent to criminal activities in and of itself since such a 
regime makes it more difficult for criminals to benefit from their acts.169 
3.5.2 Attracts Productive Investment and Taxable Revenue 
As discussed above, criminals can take over economic activities for purposes of 
concealing the profit they gain from criminal activities. Strong AML regimes provide a 
disincentive for the criminal involvement in the economy.170 This permits investments 
to be put to productive purposes that respond to consumer needs and help the 
productivity of the overall economy.171 Such investment can be by both local and 
foreign players, which is good for growing economies. 
By virtue of the lack of criminality in this kind of investment, governments are most 
likely to levy tax because the profits are available for tax purposes, unlike criminals‘ 
funds that are mostly concealed and out of reach of revenue authorities. Revenue is 
vital for many state operations, so the importance of such clean investment cannot 
be overemphasized.  
3.5.3 Enhances Stability of Financial Institutions 
Given the damaging effects of money laundering on financial institutions and the 
importance of such institutions in the economic development of developing countries, 
the fight against money laundering is very vital. One of the effects outlined earlier 
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was that money laundering can affect the public‘s confidence in a bank that is 
apparently complicit to criminal activities. However, public confidence in financial 
institutions, and hence their stability, is enhanced by sound banking practices that 
reduce financial risks to their operations.172 These risks include the potential that 
either individuals or financial institutions will experience loss as a result of fraud from 
direct criminal activity, lax internal controls or violations of laws and regulations.173 It 
is this public that constitutes the client base hence sound AML systems benefit both 
the institutions and the public at large. 
Furthermore, an effective AML regime reduces the potential that the institutions 
could experience losses from fraud.174 Where the risk of fraud is minimized, the 
continued operations of these institutions are undoubted and therefore a country 
benefits from their services, tax as well as attraction of more investments. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The global scale of money laundering is frightening as it suggests how much 
criminals are benefitting from criminal activities. Though there is no precise 
quantification of money laundering in the eastern and southern parts of Africa, its 
magnitude is evident from the prevalence of income generating crimes in the 
regions. 
A highlight of the effects of money laundering on developing countries justifies why 
ESAAMLG countries, being developing countries, should intensify the fight against 
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money laundering. The effects are that money laundering undermines financial 
systems, facilitates increase of crime and corruption, loss of revenue, capital flight, 
reputational risks and that is undermines the rule of law. All these effects are 
detrimental to developing countries such as ESAAMLG members hence the need for 
a strong AML system. 
The benefits of having in place strong and effective AML systems make the 
implementation of the Recommendations undeniably relevant. The benefits include 
deterrence of corruption and other crimes, the attraction productive investment and 
taxable revenue and the enhancement of the stability of financial institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OBSTACLES FACED BY ESAAMLG MEMBERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE CAUSES 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite the relevance of having a strong AML system as discussed in the previous 
chapter, ESAAMLG member countries are struggling with the implementation of the 
FATF Forty Recommendations on money laundering. Even the FATF has admitted 
that the implementation of its Recommendations challenges all countries, regardless 
of their economic development levels.175  
This chapter will explore the obstacles faced by ESAAMLG member countries in the 
implementation of the Recommendations. These include competing priorities for 
scarce government resources; acute shortage of material, technical and skilled 
human resources; poor record keeping frameworks; dominant informal sectors; 
cash-based economies; porous borders; lack of or insufficient political will and 
political interference. 
All the obstacles discussed in this chapter lead to weak legal and institutional 
frameworks within the ESAAMLG member countries, thereby exposing the eastern 
and southern African region to money laundering risks.  
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4.2 Competing Priorities for Scarce Government Resources 
The implementation of the Recommendations demands a lot of resources, and the 
situation is very bad for developing countries with limited resources, where the AML 
efforts compete for limited resources with high priority issues that affect basic living 
conditions in such countries.176 Even the 2009 FATF President acknowledged the 
prevalence of this problem within ESAAMLG member countries in his address at the 
ESAAMLG 9th Council of Ministers meeting.177  
Case in point is Botswana where, during the mutual evaluation that was conducted 
there, assessors noted that, despite being a middle income country, Botswana still 
faces significant development challenges, particularly given the HIV/AIDS 
situation.178 They further commented that the overall resources and budget 
constraints make it even more important for Botswana to mobilize efficiently and 
effectively the resources it can dedicate to AML.179 This shows the competition 
between national crucial priorities like Botswana‘s HIV crisis on one hand and AML 
efforts on the other hand, in terms of resource allocation. 
 
                                                             
176
 Guidance for LCCs (2008: 4). 
177
 Speech by the 2009 FATF President Paul Vlaanderen at the ESAAMLG 9th Council of Ministers 
Meeting, Maseru, Lesotho, 21 August 2009. In his speech on the point of competing priorities, 
Vlaanderen said ‗…I have to call for your continued attention and support that is needed for the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing… I do this in the full understanding that ESAAMLG 
member countries have many pressing priorities and often very limited resources.‘ 
178
 MER for Botswana (2007:10). 
179
 MER for Botswana (2007: 10). Page 12 of the report indicates that HIV/AIDS infection rate in 
Botswana is one of the highest in the world. The enormous direct costs of care and treatment are 
accompanied by the indirect loss to the economy, as well as the devastating human and social effects. 
 
43 
 
As for Malawi, its broad goals under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)180 
set to be achieved by 2015 include the fight against corruption, reforms in public and 
private sectors, safeguarding human rights and the rule of law, increasing social 
protection for vulnerable groups and developing infrastructure for development.181 
However, bearing in mind the limited financial and human resources, Malawi 
identified six ―priorities within priorities‖ which include agricultural development and 
food security, irrigation and water development, transport and communication 
infrastructure development, energy and power, integrated rural development as well 
as the management and prevention of HIV and AIDS.182  
The above-mentioned priority areas were outlined in 2007, which is almost a year 
after Malawi enacted its AML legislation and eight years since it committed itself to 
the implementation of the Recommendations by joining ESAAMLG in 1999. Be that 
as it may, AML efforts, which fall under the sub-theme of security,183 did not feature 
as a priority at all by 2007, yet the evaluating team made some recommendations 
whose implementation would demand both financial and human resources.184  
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Even in Malawi‘s national budget for 2011-2012, priority has been given to issues 
like Public Service Reforms, Agriculture and Food Security, Green Belt Irrigation and 
Water Development, Education, Science and Technology, Transport Infrastructure, 
Integrated Rural Development, Public Health, Sanitation and HIV/AIDS 
Management.185 These are the pressing needs in Malawi, demanding priority in 
terms of attention and resource allocation. However, Malawi has to make an 
allocation for financial, technical and material resources and train more personnel on 
AML as soon as possible186 so as to fully comply with Recommendation 30.187 This 
just shows how the Recommendations may come to compete with national 
immediate needs. 
Finally, this problem was also expressed by most ESAAMLG countries during a 
typology study on corruption, when they attributed the low rate of successful 
corruption prosecutions to insufficient budget allocations in the face of other 
competing national needs.188 The reality of this situation is therefore crucial to the 
implementation of AML standards. 
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4.3 Acute Shortage of Material, Technical and Skilled Human Resources  
An effective AML system demands finances, technical resources such as computers 
and skilled people to carry out AML responsibilities such as prosecutors, 
investigators and judges. Unfortunately, there is shortage of skilled personnel within 
ESAAMLG, except for South Africa and Mauritius where shortage of the skills base 
in AML is not so acute.189 Furthermore, there is also severe lack of material and 
technical resources for countries to implement AML standards effectively.190 
In Tanzania, for example, all relevant government agencies lack qualified and skilled 
human resources as well as funding and other technical resources to meet their AML 
requirements.191 Malawi also suffers the same shortcoming.192 As for Botswana, its 
courts face significant challenges and there are long delays in conducting 
prosecutions, not least due to the insufficient number of judges available.193 Uganda 
too, is faced with limited resources in all law enforcement agencies, which include 
computer hardware and analytical software.194  
These deficiencies lead to weaknesses in the institutions or competent authorities 
that are responsible for the implementation of the Recommendations. The 
institutions range from FIUs, law enforcement agencies, and supervisory bodies 
under Recommendations 26, 27, 30 and 31. For instance, Recommendation 26 
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requires countries to establish an FIU to receive, analyse and disseminate 
intelligence on suspicious transaction reports (STRs) from financial institutions, on 
suspected money laundering activities.195 In order to carry out these functions, an 
important factor in the FIU‘s functioning is an efficient information technology (IT) 
system, which can receive, analyse and distribute STRs and other intelligence as 
quickly and effectively as possible.196   
However, given the limited resources in most ESAAMLG members, the 
establishment of FIUs is a big challenge; hence very few members have functional 
FIUs197 i.e. only Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Seychelles. Notably, they all received technical assistance in one way or another to 
set up the FIU‘s given the complexities involved in the process. For instance, South 
Africa used an advisory group of key stakeholders to help build an IT structure for its 
FIU and indicated in 2002 that it would need technical assistance in training its FIU‘s 
staff and analysts.198    
Kenya, which is yet to establish an FIU after the coming into force of its AML 
legislation, indicated in 2002 that it would need technical assistance to set up 
databases and develop appropriate infrastructure and networks for an effective 
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FIU.199 Lesotho too is yet to set up its FIU with the assistance of the US Treasury, 
which has offered to setup the FIU.200  
The reliance on technical assistance is an indication of the countries‘ capacity 
limitations, but this paper questions how technical assistance may solve problems 
such as shortage of personnel as is the case in Botswana. 
4.4 Dominant Informal Sectors, Cash-Based Economies and Porous Borders 
The FATF standards presume a level of formality in the economies of countries 
implementing them.201 However contrary to this presumption, all ESAAMLG 
countries have dominant informal sectors since very few people access formal 
financial services offered by financial institutions like banks. For instance, Tanzania 
has a limited banking access, with only 10% of the population accessing formal 
financial services.202 In Malawi only 10% of the population has access to the financial 
sector as 90% is unbanked.203 Uganda is also a largely cash-based economy, where 
only a small proportion of the population has bank accounts and the percentage 
having insurance policies or owning securities is even lower.204 Zambia is also 
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categorised as a predominantly cash-based economy,205  and the same applies to 
Swaziland as well.206  
In relation to the above overview, a study conducted by ESAAMLG in 2008 revealed 
that cash courier money laundering takes place in all ESAAMLG member countries 
due to their predominantly cash based economies and porous borders.207 Vast and 
porous borders within the ESAAMLG region make the task of detecting and 
combating cash couriers even more difficult.208 Furthermore, such borders render 
border control check points ineffective as cash couriers use various alternative 
routes such as land border crossing by foot.209  
Furthermore, cash-based economies pose a big money laundering risk in the sense 
that they facilitate the physical movement of money, making it easy for criminals to 
physically move their illicit proceeds in what is termed courier-based money 
laundering.210  
The movement of money may be across borders, as criminals try to hide their money 
abroad and couriers211 will, inter alia, travel by road, through airports, by lake or sea 
with loads of cash, often stuffed into boxes, suitcases and concealed compartments 
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in vehicles and on persons.212 In this regard, the FATF‘s Special Recommendation 
IX (SR IX) on cash couriers requires countries to have in place legal and institutional 
frameworks that facilitate the detection of physical cross-border transportation of 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments.213  
The cash courier money laundering risk is further underscored through results of the 
mutual evaluations of each of the mentioned countries. Tanzania was found non-
compliant on SR IX as it had not implemented its requirements at all.214 Malawi was 
found partially compliant because even though it had the law in place, the 
implementation of the declaration or disclosure system was limited to foreign 
exchange violations in Malawi when travellers leave the country.215  
Uganda was found to be non-compliant because it does not have a law regulating 
cash couriers.216 The assessors reiterated that Uganda‘s position as regards this 
Special Recommendation poses a big money laundering risk considering that it is 
largely a cash-based economy and the movement of cash across the border was a 
frequent event.217 Zambia‘s was rated non-compliant for reasons such as the 
absence of provisions in Zambian laws directly regulating the cross border transfer of 
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currency related to money laundering and terrorist financing.218 Swaziland is non-
compliant too for not having any declaration measures to comply with this Special 
Recommendation.219 
The author thus agrees with the findings of the ESAAMLG study, which showed that 
most member countries have limited or no legislation to deal with the cash 
movement and cash-courier money laundering.220 The study also revealed that 
countries are challenged by the shortage of technical expertise and resources 
required to deal with the problem of cash couriers.221  
4.5 Poor Record Keeping Systems 
There are poor record-keeping systems in ESAAMLG member countries as will be 
shown below. Record-keeping is captured under Recommendation 10. It requires 
financial institutions to maintain for at least five years, all necessary transaction 
records to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from competent 
authorities.222 Failure to keep such records affects the implementation of key 
Recommendations such as Recommendation 3 on confiscation, freezing and seizing 
of the proceeds of crime.223 Confiscation of illicit proceeds relies heavily on 
identification records of criminals, records of transactions that they conduct with 
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financial institutions, registration of businesses and transfer of assets. This is so 
because the core element of Recommendation 3 is that there should be measures in 
place to identify, trace and evaluate property which is subject to confiscation.224 As 
such, a successful confiscation is not possible where there are no records use for 
the identification, tracing and evaluation of illicit property which, in most cases, 
passes through financial institutions.  
Within ESAAMLG, Tanzania has no effective provisions pertaining to the retention of 
transaction records and neither does it impose sanctions for failure to comply with 
record keeping requirements under its AML Act.225 Tanzania also has no specific 
retention period for which the required records must be kept.226 In Botswana, too, 
there is no effective implementation of the record keeping requirements by 
designated bodies other than banks and bureaux de change.227 There are also 
inconsistencies in Botswana, with regard to the timeframe requirement under the 
Banking (AML) Regulation on record keeping after the completion of the 
transaction.228  
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4.6 Political Will and its Effects 
Implementation of the FATF Recommendations requires strong political will or 
commitment to begin and sustain the process and pace of reforms without which it is 
very difficult to identify and commit the resources required for effective AML/CFT 
implementation.229 As stated earlier on, all ESAAMLG members showed their 
commitment to implementing the FATF Recommendations by joining ESAAMLG and 
signing the ESAAMLG MOU. However, the ESAAMLG Secretariat has stated that 
obtaining and sustaining political will among ESAAMLG members is the major 
underlying factor that impedes the implementation of the AML/CFT legal and 
institutional framework.230 This paper has also shown that the members are affected 
by lack of resources and the capacity to effectively implement the Recommendations 
effectively.  
However, the delays in implementing some of the Recommendations that do not 
demand the deployment of significant financial and human resources suggest the 
lack or insufficiency of political will on the part of member countries to have in place 
an effective AML/CFT system. Such lack or insufficiency of political will results into 
crucial consequences in the AML regime, such as delays in enacting or amending 
AML and AML related legislation, as discussed below. 
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4.6.1 Unreasonable Delays to Enact AML/CFT Legislation 
The effectiveness of an AML regime is premised on the existence of a legal and 
institutional framework that provides for the criminalisation of money laundering.231 
This means that having in place legislation that adequately criminalises money 
laundering an offence is vital.  However, the ESAAMLG Secretariat has expressed 
that the lack of political will impedes the implementation of the AML/CFT legal and 
institutional framework as some of the members still have to enact AML/CFT 
legislation.232 This means that for such countries, money laundering has not yet been 
criminalised; hence they have weak AML legal frameworks. 
The first example on this is Uganda which despite being an ESAAMLG founding 
member in 1999,233 has not yet passed AML legislation. The Ugandan authorities 
clearly stated during a mutual evaluation that they had the necessary political will 
and support from the Cabinet of Ministers to pass legislation that will meet the 40+9 
FATF Recommendations, yet by that time the bill had not even been tabled in 
Parliament.234 This was said in 2007, and Uganda had agreed to enact AML 
legislation in 1996 at the Cape Town conference mentioned earlier on in this paper. 
Uganda‘s political will is therefore debatable in this respect. 
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Similarly, despite being an ESAAMLG founding member, Kenya too passed its AML 
legislation only in 2010 following a series of condemnations by the FATF.235 One 
wonders why it had to take such public condemnation to make Kenya pass a law, 
whose enactment was one of the issues it committed to do by pledging to implement 
the FATF Recommendations in 1999. Kenya also agreed to enact its AML legislation 
in 1996 at the Cape Town conference. The reasons for the delay will be dealt with 
later in the discussion, but the main one was that parliament itself was not keen to 
pass this law.236 There was thus no sufficient political will on the part of this important 
arm of the Kenyan Government, the legislature.  
4.6.2 Unreasonable Delays to Amend AML/CFT and Related Legislation 
Apart for the actual enactment of legislation, lack of political will is evidenced by 
unreasonable delays displayed by countries in amending existing AML/CFT and 
related laws, so as to bring their respective legal systems in harmony with the FATF 
Recommendations. The first case in point is Malawi, whose AML legislation has not 
yet been tabled in Parliament for amendments proposed by the assessment team in 
2008.237  
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As of March 2010, Zimbabwe was also yet to amend its AML legislation238 as 
recommended by assessors during its 2006 mutual evaluation.239 Despite being 
evaluated in 2005, Namibia is also yet to review the provisions of its International 
Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act of 2000 to ensure that it continues to meet the 
mutual legal assistance (MLA) requirements of Namibia and the international 
community.240 It should be noted from the years given above it has taken all these 
three countries more than three years to amend their existing laws. The question 
here would be where is the political will to have an effective AML legal system 
through amendments as recommended by assessors? 
4.7 Political and Personal Concerns by Parliamentarians 
Politics plays a big role in the implementation of various government policies and 
programs. The most notable forum for such is the parliament, where members vote 
in order to pass legislation. Political divisions between the ruling and opposition 
parties have played a crucial role especially in the passing of important laws, 
including AML/CFT laws.  
This is true for Malawi, whose AML Act241 took about four years to be passed since 
its introduction in parliament because of concerns raised by the opposition members 
of parliament. Among the objections raised, the opposition on several occasions 
refused to pass the law for fear that it was meant to target and persecute them.242 
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Ironically, the chairman of the Parliamentarian Legal Affairs Committee Mr Atupele 
Muluzi, son Malawi‘s former president Dr Bakili Muluzi, strongly opposed the passing 
of the Bill fearing that it was targeting his father who was facing embezzlement 
charges.243 As a compromise, the opposition members of parliament demanded that 
they could only pass this law on condition that provisions on civil forfeiture should be 
struck off the Bill for fears that they could be used arbitrarily against them by the 
incumbent government.244 
In Uganda, too, parliamentarians expressed fear that the proposed AML Act could be 
used against political opponents.245 The parliamentarians also questioned how the 
law would be enforced against the ―strong‖ and ―untouchables‖ both in politics and 
business, how to handle retired politicians who have ceased to be politically 
exposed, and proposed a provision for compensation of victims of unsuccessful 
prosecution of the law.246 When the Bill finally made it to Parliament in 2009, the 
Governor of the Bank of Uganda lamented that it had taken ten years to have the Bill 
endorsed and ready for parliamentary discussion.247 All this was happening despite 
Uganda‘s 1996 agreement to pass the law, as well as an indication to the World 
Bank, ESAAMLG and other AML international bodies in 2002 that it had already 
drafted the bill and that it was under discussion.248 
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A similar problem arose in Kenya where some parliamentarians delayed in passing 
the AML law since 2004, out of fears that it was trying to target the Muslim 
community.249 Presenting this argument in November 2009 was an Assistant 
Minister for Public Service who further argued that implementing the Bill would be 
bowing to the interests of external pressure and said that Kenya by then had 
adequate laws in place to deter money laundering.250 While supporting the Bill, the 
Defence Minister also echoed the same concern but the Bill was passed, after the 
Prime Minister Raila Odinga assured those concerned that the law did not intend to 
victimise the Muslim community.251 The Bill was finally passed by parliament in 2010 
after provisions against terrorist financing were removed as a compromise reached 
to pass it since that was the main concern of the Muslim community both within and 
outside parliament.252 All this was happening despite an indication made on 11 
September 2002 that by then Kenya had already drafted a bill based on the United 
Nations model.253 
Zambia also experienced an episode of selfish concerns by politicians. It is believed 
that the government delayed the enactment of the AML law out of the self-interest of 
influential high-ranking government officials in the administration of Dr Frederick 
Chiluba who, at the time, were involved in alleged laundering of funds corruptly 
obtained from the state.254 
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All these concerns show how politicians prioritise their political or personal concerns 
instead of prioritising the benefits of such laws for the people and society they serve. 
Going by the concerns raised in Malawi, Kenya and Uganda, it is doubtful that these 
parliamentarians had embraced or cared about the benefits of having AML 
legislation in the first place. 
4.8 Political Interference and its Impact on the Independence of AML 
Authorities and Institutions 
As stated earlier on, politics plays a huge role in the implementation of government 
policies. Politics has a way of undermining the independence of crucial law 
enforcement agencies, whose independence is vital for the creation of an effective 
AML regime. For instance, the independence of an FIU would guarantee that FIUs 
can effectively analyse and disseminate to law enforcement suspicious information 
concerning any person, including influential government officials, without any undue 
influence. However, where such independence is compromised by political 
interference from government leadership, an FIU‘s work will be limited to those that 
have no links to the government. This is why Recommendation 26 emphasises the 
independence of FIUs. 
The same argument applies to prosecution and investigative authorities, whose 
decisions on who to investigate and prosecute is not supposed to depend on the 
suspect‘s links to the political leadership. The independence of the judiciary, too, is 
of paramount importance as it guarantees that courts can make decisions against 
anyone in a society, including those in power. In this regard, merely having the AML 
laws in place and excellent compliance with the reporting obligations by the financial 
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institutions would mean nothing to an AML regime without independent and efficient 
law enforcement or judicial authorities. 
Political interference appears to be a major problem within most ESAAMLG 
countries, where cases of politically linked persons suspected of mere predicate 
offence charges are hardly pursued. The first example is Zambia, where in 2006 the 
prosecution of a former permanent secretary in the Ministry of health, Dr Kashiwa 
Bulaya on three corruption charges, was withdrawn by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions who issued a nolle prosequi.255 There was no good explanation for the 
withdrawal, only for the public to realise later that the suspect had actually testified 
favourably for the then Zambian President Mwanawasa in his election petition.256 
The sudden withdrawal sharply contradicted Mwanawasa‘s zero tolerance campaign 
against corruption, hence the public did not approve of the move but successfully 
pushed for the reopening of the case against Dr Bulaya.257  
Furthermore, the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission was under strong political 
influence of the Fredrick Chiluba regime (immediately preceding Mwanawasa‘s) 
because most government officials, including President Chiluba himself, were 
allegedly involved in widespread corruption.258 This was happening even though the 
Commission was said to be independent.  
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The second example is Swaziland where, under the Constitution259 King Nswati III 
virtually controls the executive, the judiciary and the legislature through his powers to 
appoint and fire members of these three arms of government.260 In essence, before 
dismissing or disciplining judicial officers, the King is supposed to consult the Judicial 
Services Commission.261 However, the King is not bound by the recommendations of 
the Commission, and the independence of the Commission itself is not guaranteed 
when all the six members are appointed by him.262 
The first example of political interference is the forced resignation of the Swaziland 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Lincoln Ng‘arua in 2002, who faced considerable 
pressure from the government after he instituted criminal charges against the then 
Attorney General, on sedition and defeating ends of justice.263 He was eventually 
called to a meeting one night by government officials who forced him to withdraw the 
charges against the Attorney General.264 His resistance to the suggestion resulted 
into more acts of intimidation perpetrated among others, by the Attorney General 
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himself and members of the Swazi National Council, thus forcing him to resign and 
leave Swaziland.265 
Political interference was also felt in the judiciary in the same year, 2002, when a 
High Court Judge, Justice Thomas Masuku, was harassed for his stance to uphold 
human rights in his rulings and also for his resistance to the government‘s pressure 
and influence on the judiciary.266 He was transferred from the High Court to the 
Industrial Court and the then Prime Minister justified this by saying that it was evident 
from his rulings that Masuku was anti-government  hence was transferred to the 
Industrial Court where he would be less political.267   
Masuku was fired on 29th September 2001 following a claim by the Swazi Chief 
Justice that Masuku had insulted the King in one of his rulings, among other 
allegations. 268 Amnesty International condemned the way the Chief Justice 
conducted and controlled the dismissal proceedings against Masuku.269 
In a related issue, a Minister of Justice was also suspended for refusing to authorise 
Masuku‘s dismissal.270 All this shows the tense political atmosphere in Swaziland 
where all the interests of the King are protected by his ―hand-picked‖ officials such as 
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the Chief Justice in this case, and all who try to resist political interference face 
suspension as did the Minister of Justice or dismissal through the ‗Kangaroo‖ 
dismissal proceedings Masuku went through. 
Furthermore, the King holds the power to appoint a Commissioner of police, who is 
responsible for the administration and discipline of the Swazi Police Service.271 The 
significance of the Police service is that it is responsible for the preservation of peace, 
prevention and detection of crime, as well as the apprehension of offenders.272 It is 
also primarily responsible for the investigation of money laundering offences through 
its Fraud and Commercial Unit.273 Given the level of political interference by the 
executive, the independence of the police service to effectively investigate a money 
laundering case against people connected to the government is almost an illusion.  
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that ESAAMLG member countries face many obstacles. 
Some of the challenges are peculiar to their economic situations, such as 
predominant cash-based economies and dominant informal sectors, which raises the 
risk of cash-courier money laundering. This can be cured by encouraging financial 
inclusion of the unbanked population. Obstacles such as shortage of material, 
technological and skilled personnel can be addressed by provision of more 
resources and training programs by governments and organisations that give 
technical assistance. Poor record keeping can be addressed through legislation. 
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However, governments have limited capacities to achieve this due to other national 
priorities that demand priority in terms of resource allocation.  
There are also obstacles such as lack of political will which leads to inordinate delays 
in enacting or amending AML legislation; political and personal concerns by 
parliamentarians when making AML related decisions and political interference 
which undermines the independence of crucial AML institutions. Tackling these 
obstacles however requires other strategies other than technical assistance or 
allocation of more resources by governments because they are more of an attitude 
problem by political leaders, other than the availability of resources or the economic 
situations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE FATF’s SOLUTIONS TO THE OBSTACLES, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter assesses the adequacy of the measures that have been taken by the 
FATF to address the obstacles responsible for the slow implementation of its 
Recommendations. After the assessment, the paper concludes with a set of 
recommendations to address any deficiencies in the FATF‘s measures vis-à-vis the 
peculiar situations of respective ESAAMLG member countries. 
5.2 What is Being Done to Address the Obstacles in Low Capacity Countries 
(LCCs)?  
The ultimate goal of the FATF is to see its Recommendations being implemented 
fully and effectively by all countries in the world.274 However, as already stated in the 
precious chapter, the FATF has recognised the challenges being faced by 
ESAAMLG member countries in the implementation of its Recommendations. In 
relation to this, the FATF has since identified countries with low capacity (LCCs), as 
countries that face the most challenges in implementing the Recommendations.275  
They are generally characterised as low income countries with the following 
characteristics: competing priorities for scarce government resources; severe lack of 
resources and skilled workforce to implement Government programmes; overall 
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weakness in legal institutions; dominant informal sector and cash-based economies; 
poor documentation and data retention systems; and very small financial sectors.276 
All these characteristics of an LCC befit the obstacles within ESAAMLG as 
discussed in the previous chapter, making ESAAMLG countries are essentially 
LCCs. 
The purpose of this guidance is to help LCCs to implement the FATF 
Recommendations fully and effectively, bearing in mind their challenges and 
limitations.277 The guidance also seeks to help LCCs mitigate their money laundering 
and terrorist financing risks in a manner that is consistent with a country‘s peculiar 
situation and peculiarities.278 It also aims at improving the relevance and benefits of 
mutual evaluations in LCCs.279 
In essence, this guidance provides principles, mechanisms and procedures 
necessary for the effective prioritisation and implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations.280 As such the FATF has identified ‗core‘ and ‗key‘ 
Recommendations to be prioritised by LCCs in phases, since an attempt to 
implement all the Recommendations has proved difficult due to resource 
limitations.281 These ‗core‘ Recommendations include the criminalisation of money 
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laundering (R1), CDD and record keeping (R5 and R10), and STR reporting 
(R13).282  
The ‗key‘ Recommendations are on provisional measures and confiscation(R.3), 
financial institution secrecy laws (R.4), the FIU (R. 26), supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions (R.23), international cooperation (R.35, SRV), mutual legal 
assistance (R36), other forms of cooperation (R.40), and ratification and 
implementation of UN Instruments (SRI).283 
5.2.1 Implications of Prioritisation 
Prioritisation implies that, for instance, in countries with predominant cash 
economies, paying more attention to the informal sector than the formal sector may 
be preferable considering the risks it poses, such as easy movement of illicit 
proceeds and the non-existence of an audit trail.284  
5.2.2 Procedures and Mechanisms of Prioritisation 
The guidance proposes three themes that are relevant throughout the process of 
implementation of the Recommendations. 
First it suggests that an LCC should develop AML Strategic plans, showing which 
Recommendations it has prioritised to implement and within which period. Secondly, 
it encourages LCCs to prepare for mutual evaluations beforehand. Thirdly, it 
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encourages LCCs to develop strategies implementation plans that focus on 
addressing issues picked up as deficiencies during a mutual evaluation.  
The guidance also suggests how to obtain political commitment through cooperation 
and engagement, leadership and interagency cooperation and coordination, 
involvement of the private sector through private sector outreach and consultation, 
and technical assistance/engagement with FSRBs.285 
5.3 Merits and Demerits of the LCC Guidance  
The proposals made by the guidance have merits and demerits, as discussed below.  
5.3.1 Prioritisation 
ESAAMLG member countries are already implementing the proposal on developing 
AML national strategies and strategic implementation plans. This paper thus will only 
assess the proposed prioritisation because of its links to some of the obstacles 
observed in the previous chapter. 
The argument is that indeed attempting to implement all the Recommendations 
wholesale is too ambitious given to resource restraints within ESAAMLG. However, 
even if countries prioritise criminalisation of money laundering, for instance, in their 
strategic plans, it is questionable as to how long such a phase would take given the 
inordinate delays occasioned by politicians. 
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5.3.2 Political Commitments through Cooperation and Engagement 
On cooperation and engagement, the FATF acknowledges the importance of political 
commitment; as such it suggests engagement and awareness for political decision 
makers through workshops so as to help them understand the benefits of AML 
policies and the resources they demand for implementation.286 It further suggests 
that ministers should be briefed particularly on the ‗core‘ FATF Recommendations, 
what the commitment to implement the Recommendations demands, its implications, 
implementation planning and progress made.287 
This appears to be a good approach since decision makers can only make 
allocations for AML policies when they are convinced of their benefits to society and 
the economy as discussed in chapter 3 of this paper. Nevertheless, based on the 
discussions in the previous chapter that parliamentarians and even cabinet ministers 
are driven by their political affiliations and concerns i.e. that they are targets of the 
AML regime; the impact of such workshops on the change of this attitude is 
debatable.  
This suggestion presumes a situation where political decision makers are primarily 
concerned with the welfare of their countries and that political divisions do not play a 
crucial role in their decisions. The suggestion also presumes that these decision 
makers‘ lack of commitment is based on ignorance on the ignorance of the costs and 
benefits of having an effective AML regime.  
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However, the experience of Parliamentarians and cabinet minister objecting and 
delaying the passing of AML legislation in Kenya, Malawi and Uganda, purely on 
personal and political grounds, shows that the problem is beyond what the FATF has 
suggested in this guidance.  
Furthermore, given the obstacle of political interference discussed in the previous 
chapter and the way it undermines the independence of competent AML authorities 
in Swaziland for example, it is questionable whether holding AML awareness 
workshops for the King and his political associates alone can change their political 
interference tendencies. They have been criticised many times by international 
organisations such as Amnesty International, for victimising and politically interfering 
with the duties of a Swazi DPP and judge Masuku in 2004; judge Masuku again and 
a Minister of Justice in 2011. However, the criticism did not yield any change in the 
system, yet criticism carries more weight in terms of publicity of the bad thing being 
criticised than an awareness-raising workshop, which is just informative and places 
no pressure to the participants.   
In addition, regular briefing of ministers on the ‗core‘ Recommendations is a good 
proposal because they are the backbone of the executive arm of government. 
However, given the cabinet reshuffles that take place in countries, this suggestion 
would be inefficient when those that have been briefed are moved and new people 
come in.  
An example would be the 2009-2011 Malawi Finance Minister, Mr Kandodo who was 
the head of the ESAAMLG Council of Ministers when Malawi assumed the 
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ESAAMLG presidency from August 2010 to September 2011.288 However, by the 
time of the 11th ESAAMLG Council of Ministers‘ meeting on 8 September 2011, 
when Malawi was supposed to hand over the presidency to Mauritius,289 there was 
no finance minister in Malawi following a dissolution of cabinet by the President on 
19 August 2011.290 Kandodo is no longer a cabinet member, and a new finance 
minister, was appointed on 6 September 2011, just two days before the ESAAMLG 
meeting.291 Now given the loss of a finance minister who was actively involved in 
AML issues and following the FATF‘s suggestion, it means Malawi would have to 
brief the new finance minister, whose tenure of office is unpredictable.  
5.3.3 Leadership and Interagency Co-operation and Co-ordination 
The FATF has suggested that LCCs should identify a lead governmental agency with 
sufficient political influence and credibility to spearhead the national AML/CFT efforts 
in coordination with other key stakeholders who would own certain key aspects of 
the AML/CFT policy.292  
This is a good suggestion as it attempts to ensure that AML/CFT policies are brought 
to the attention of decision makers for support and resources, and this is possible if 
the pressure comes from a politically influential government agency.  
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5.3.4 Private Sector Outreach and Consultation 
The FATF further suggests that the private sector players such as financial 
institutions should be involved in the development of AML/CFT policies by having 
their representation in AML/CFT awareness programs, among others.293 This 
suggestion is made against the background that the financial sector is crucial in an 
AML regime as it can be a conduit of illicit proceeds. Furthermore, the sector should 
be involved because it deals with customers and thus has knowledge on practical 
aspects of the implementation of government policies such as the AML policy.294  
This indeed is a good way of understanding the challenges financial institutions meet 
in complying with Recommendations such as R5 and R10 on CDD and record 
keeping, which are a problem within ESAAMLG as stated earlier. However, there is a 
question of costs arising on this issue again as to who will be funding these outreach 
programs? 
5.3.5 Technical Assistance 
The FATF also recommends LCCs to use technical assistance so as to meet their 
AML requirements in situations where they need such assistance.295 As stated 
earlier, most ESAAMLG countries rely on technical assistance on pertinent issues 
such as drafting of AML legislation or setting up FIUs. The use of technical 
assistance is not only good but also convenient for LCCs such as ESAAMLG 
member countries that lack the expertise to draft effective AML laws, train personnel 
or buy technical resources. 
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However, technical assistance is limited in terms of how far it can go in making an 
LCC‘s AML system effective. For instance, there is little that technical assistance can 
do to the criminalisation of money laundering or amendment of AML related 
legislation, when the power and mandate of doing this rests with parliamentarians 
who may in some cases not be keen enact or amend such laws. Essentially, 
therefore, technical assistance may only be relevant in addressing obstacles such as 
lack of material, human and technical resources. However, technical assistance may 
not address political interference or lack of political will. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Money laundering is a global and complex problem that calls for concerted global 
efforts and this is why the FATF issued its Recommendations as global AML 
standards to be applied by all countries. The Recommendations were exclusively 
drafted and developed by developed countries to the exclusion of the developing 
countries, who were merely invited to endorse and implement them. Some countries 
such as Malawi, adopted the Recommendations out of pressure and fear of risking 
foreign aid and foreign investment.  
Since the Recommendations were exclusively developed by developed countries, 
they are expensive to implement for the developing countries and they largely reflect 
the economic and structural situations of the developed world,296 i.e. most developed 
countries have the capacity to meet the costs of implementation and they have 
digitalised identification systems that make CDD requirements easier to comply with.  
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Even though money laundering‘s effects are felt by both the developed and 
developing world and the implementation of the Recommendations challenges both, 
developing countries struggle the most. This is because most developing countries 
are small cash economies, have poor identification systems, limited AML capacity 
and under-developed democracies, among other limitations. 
Developing countries such as ESAAMLG member countries are affected by very 
limited capacity, lack or insufficient political will and political interference, which are 
the main obstacles to the effective implementation of the Recommendations. As far 
as capacity is concerned, it would be a fallacy to conclude that ESAAMLG member 
countries have adopted the ―adopt but do not enforce‖ strategy mentioned in chapter 
one, because their implementation is challenged by lack of resources. However, the 
argument would hold water when one considers the political obstacles, which have 
nothing to do with capacity, but more to do with the attitude of political decision 
makers for these countries. Their lack of political will displays unwillingness to have a 
vibrant AML system. 
Even though ESAAMLG member countries did not take part in the development of 
the Recommendations, they are nevertheless under pressure to implement them. 
This pressure comes by way of mutual evaluation reports or publicity through the 
FATF‘s ICRG process. Be that as it may, immediate solutions to the obstacles they 
face during implementation are necessary, given the magnitude of income 
generating economic activities that are prevalent within the ESAAMLG member 
countries. The prevalence of such criminal activities makes the implementation of the 
FATF Recommendations relevant, regardless of what led a particular ESAAMLG 
member country to their endorsement and adoption. 
74 
 
In view of the challenges faced by LCCs such as ESAAMLG member countries, the 
FATF has issued guidance which encourages a prioritised implementation approach 
of the Recommendations that require immediate attention in each jurisdiction. This is 
to avoid wholesale attempts to implement the Recommendations at once, which has 
so far been proven difficult for LCCs. However, the issues suggested in this 
guidance are only effective in addressing capacity issues affecting most ESAAMLG 
member countries. The guidance falls short of addressing the politically coated 
obstacles that have more to do with attitudes of political decision makers, political 
contexts and political insecurities. 
This paper argues that unless a concrete solution is found for these political 
obstacles, even the issue of capacity will hardly be addressed. Solutions such as 
awareness raising or seeking technical assistance will mean nothing if those with the 
power to allocate national resources, to pass or amend AML laws and to politically 
ensure the independence of AML institutions, are not willing to fight money 
laundering. They should nevertheless be taught that there are costs for adopting and 
implementing the AML standards, as well as costs for failure to comply with them.297 
5.5 Recommendations 
Having outlined the obstacles being faced by ESAAMLG member countries and the 
proposed guidance by the FATF, this paper argues that political obstacles are a 
bigger problem whose solution lies beyond what the guidance is suggesting. 
The other obstacles that merely reflect lack of financial and human capacity can be 
dealt with by provision of resources by governments or technical assistance 
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providers. However, getting the attention and genuine support of politicians, who 
choose not to embrace the AML efforts for personal or political reasons, calls for an 
integrated approach as stated below. 
5.5.1 Enhancement of the ICRG Process 
First, this paper advocates for the continued use of the ICRG process mentioned in 
chapter two of this paper, as a tool to push political decision makers in prioritising 
and owning the establishment of a vibrant AML system. The political commitment 
and cooperation of these authorities cannot only be ultimately obtained through the 
awareness suggested by the FATF in its guidance for LCCs and also by applying 
pressure from outside rather than inside their jurisdictions. This is possible because 
of the FATF‘s call on all countries to apply counter-measures when dealing with 
countries identified as non-compliant or making very little progress in addressing 
their AML risks and deficiencies. The call also affects dealings with the identified 
countries‘ companies and financial institutions.  
Such counter- measures have been proven to be effective before within ESAAMLG. 
For example in the case of the Seychelles which had passed a law perceived to 
encourage criminal activities and money laundering by investors in 1995. The FATF 
called upon the whole world to apply strict measures when dealing with Seychelles 
and its financial institutions. As explained in chapter three, the effects were 
detrimental and they lingered on even after Seychelles had repealed the 
controversial law.  
This example should be taken seriously by developing countries like ESAAMLG 
members whose economies rely on transactions with foreign financial institutions 
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during imports and exports, among other things. The Seychellois example should be 
regularly emphasised to the political decision makers of all ESAAMLG countries, 
while stressing on the detrimental consequences their countries may suffer if they 
ever appear on the FATF Public Statement. This should be done during the 
workshops proposed by the FATF, among other fora. 
In essence this paper recommends the use of the ICRG process on ESAAMLG 
members to complement the suggestions in the FATFs guidance for LCCs. 
5.5.2 Enhancement of Technical Assistance 
Secondly, given the cost of implementing some of the Recommendations that form 
the basis of the ICRG process, for example setting up functional FIUs, this paper 
recommends the enhancement of technical assistance. This is to avoid a situation 
where countries deploy resources to set up FIUs due to pressure, at the expense of 
priority national areas such as HIV/AIDS or food production. The technical 
assistance providers and the FATF need to understand this from the background 
that these developing countries did not take part in the development of these costly 
Recommendations in the first place, so the countries‘ limitations and immediate 
needs and priorities should be appreciated. The FATF and technical assistance 
providers should remember that developing states face significant costs in both 
adopting and implementing the Recommendations and also for failing to implement 
them. They pay the cost on non-implementation by suffering consequences of 
appearing on the FATF Public Statement. They should thus be helped to implement 
the Recommendations so as to avoid facing the costs of failure to implement, in 
situations where such implementation goes beyond their capacity. 
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5.5.3 The ICRG Process to Apply to Lax Financial Institutions  
Thirdly, this paper recommends expanding the ambit of the ICRG Process. Currently 
it is targeting jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies on AML/CFT. However, studies 
have revealed that illicit proceeds valued between $20 and $40 billion a year from 
the developing and transitional countries are laundered and circulated in US and 
European Banks.298 An example is Citibank which facilitated laundering of the funds 
of big African, Latin American and Asian politically exposed persons despite the US 
AML legislation having strict CDD measures.299 In this regard therefore, it is only 
prudent if the FATF were to publicly condemn such financial institutions and call 
upon all other countries to apply counter measures when dealing with them because 
of the risk they pose to the international financial market.  
Doing so would mitigate the perception that the developed world is somehow aiding 
and abetting money laundering through inadequate CDD measures applied on well 
known politically exposed persons from the developing world. This would deter 
complacency on European and US banks which are the most convenient destination 
for illicit funds from the developing world. This will show that the FATF is also willing 
to publicly condemn even jurisdictions and financial institutions of its own founding 
members. 
As such, once an investigation reveals a financial institution‘s complacency and 
facilitation of money laundering, it should appear on a FATF‘s public statement with 
                                                             
298
 Tang and Lishan (2010: 221). A study in 2001 shows that over a decade, criminal proceeds worthy 
between $2.5 and $5 trillion criminal proceeds had been laundered through the US financial circuits.  
299
 Tang and Lishan (2010: 222). Citibank was involved in laundering funds of Raul Salinas- brother of 
Mexico‘s ex-President, Asif Ali Zaidari-husband of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, El Hagj Omar 
Bongo-Dictator of Gabon and sons of Ex-president of Nigeria, Sani Abacha. 
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condemnation and a call for counter-measures. These institutions would hence 
suffer the effects of bad reputation as discussed in chapter three of the paper. 
5.5.4 Embracing the theory of Re-socialisation 
Finally, this paper argues that political will of national decision makers is vital in the 
building of a strong and effective AML system. The lack of political will cannot be 
addressed merely by technical assistance or having AML legislation in place. This 
political will is also needed also in the actual implementation of the AML legislation 
and regulations where they exist so as to avoid the problem of enforcement deficit 
noted in most ESAAMLG member countries.  
In this respect therefore, this paper supports the FATF‘s suggestion on awareness -
raising by borrowing Indira Carr‘s idea of re-socialisation.300 She writes in corruption 
terms that people should be made aware of the long-term effects of corruption on the 
human condition, and educating them on their central role in its prevention.301 This, 
she says, should be done through public education programs facilitated by NGOs, 
civil society organisations and activists. The awareness should be on the impact and 
consequences of one‘s behaviour, which not only in relation to oneself or those close 
to him, but on the whole society, humanity and generations, both current and 
future.302 
This theory is relevant in the AML discourse, where the public should be taught of 
the long term effects of money laundering as well as the benefits of having a vibrant 
                                                             
300
 Carr (2007: 243). 
301
 Carr (2007: 244). 
302
 Carr (2007: 245). 
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AML system, as discussed in chapter two. This awareness should thus apply to 
government leaders (political decision makers), the private sector and the general 
public. The awareness should be facilitated by governments where they can, the 
FATF and all the technical assistance providers. 
If people are taught and appreciate the consequences of money laundering, they will 
desist from laundering or tolerating it. Similarly, if parliamentarians appreciate such 
consequences and their duty not to tolerate money laundering, not only for their own 
sakes but for the goodness of both the current and future generations, both within 
their jurisdictions and beyond, they will not deliberately delay or obstruct the passing 
or amendment of important AML legislation, among other important AML decisions 
they have to make. 
(18 777 words) 
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